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  • to reply, touching upon regional development prospects in the Caribbean area, the President answered his telephone . While the President was on the telephone, the Prime Minister and the Reporting Officer conversed briefly on the above theme ::c
  • . On the state of the Nation, he said: is going to hell. " 11 1 just don't think this country MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 12, 1967 11:00 a. m. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Bob Fleming Attached are notes on your conversation
  • . It did not even include a confusion ploy. Hanoi has done nothing. In all conversations -- and we have a telephone on every line - - the other party has merely hung up. We now n eed to make a report to the UN Security Council and consider whether
  • and on the actions which the Secretary of Stat~ was proposing. After con~iderable di~cussion of the~e proposals, the follouing were decided upon: f ~ f ~ ~ A) The President would speak on the telephone wi.th President Chfa.ri, provided that Mr. Salinger was able
  • this morning. (The President had Miss Nivens in Walt Ro stow' s office read the message over the telephone; the message thanked Wilson and Brown for standing firm despite party pressures.) We all have our peculiar problems; all of us have our setbacks
  • .·~· ~:~~: : .. T~fl_~~ ~~~.:.·. ::::·:,:~~~ .~-~.:. ~-'; MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: ;.:·~.~ --- 9 ~:::!.Y..)!~v. . ·. ~ ~·-,; ~·, ..... \\. ·-··-vw....., .:.'. .___·. . 1:.._.._-~ u·.-.. 1.11..:. /0-1',L#j~ ii! c Telephone conversation with General
  • to stand up out there. We are not about to return to the enclave theories. President Eisenhower said, · what I want most for the President is for him to win the war. {A copy of the telephone conversation with General Eisenhower is attached as Appendix
  • ­ The President: The only way to line it up is to proceed. LThe President read Eugene Rostow 1 s note of October 29: "Walt: I had a further talk with my informant about the luncheon conversation he attended yesterday. The man who spoke was a member of the banking
  • our conclusions. The item will be revised to state these as points to be examined. 3. Secretary Rusk invited the DCI to comment on Ambassador Lodge's conversation with General Khanh (SAIG EMBTEL-2108). The Director commented on the basis of Saigon 6203
  • of State Katzenbach Ambassador nt Large Harriman Assistant Secrciary of State - William Bundy Assistant Secre_tary of State - Josc0h J. Sisco U~ITED r The conversation concentrated exclusively on Vietnam. Whilel the details of the give-and-take are given
  • told hi..-n. President: How about Lodge, any roadbl ock Rusk: Not yet, perhaps later. President: We got a telegr. from Symington. That prob. comes from Air Force people. President: You see anything from any of these conversations that would
  • in Laos. 7. We should stay away from talks about Cambodia. 8. We must push them to admit the facts about civilian losses in Hue. 9. It is essential to probe for private conversations. TOP SECRET ;. - 2 ­ The President: Will they do anything until
  • !Son \~ [1 of 3] ~EYESONLY - 2 - Secretary Rusk said that Israel "has won a battle and not a war." Mr. Rostow discussed his conversations with Mr. David Ginsburg and Mr. Abe Feinberg. The President said many of the Jewish leaders want us to make
  • -~ Attending: The President Secretary Clifford Undersecretary Katzenbach CIA Director Helms General Wheeler George Christian Walt Rostow Tom Johnson President: Are you concerned about Jord.en's conversation? Under secretary Katzenbach: I am encouraged
  • is extremely criti cal of the e ntire war effort. Ambassador Harriman: reporte d on his recent conversations with Kosy gin and Tito: Mr. Kosygin, who speaks for his government, does not want to get the UN involved in the Vietnam prol::lem. He says U. S. bombing
  • he would like a coalition government reflecting his French conversations. Privately, he is willing to propose the five powers plus North and South Vietnam - - including the National Liberation Front. This very bes t we can ge t him to do. U Tha nt ha
  • assistance programs. Moreover, the prospects of · reaching agreement with the Soviets on a treaty governing the exploration of outer space are reasonably good. We can alsc use the Assembly period to probe quietly in private conversations possible further
  • to the 19th.. They may have to ask for total cessation or no more conversations. There is a question of face involved. 4. Curious oriental approach -- this action could give them reason to break off negotiations. It is small chance, but I do not like
  • . Assistant Secretary Bundy: We must do some hard thinking about what we say in private conversation. Walt Rostow: We must probe the proposal that a political solution must precede a military settlement. We must proceed to get with Thieu on proposals
  • and unbending. We will stop bombing under right conditions. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS: We have tried to come up with formula to let us stop the bombing with no public Vance: They have refused to suggest anything at this point. will not permit the Thieu-Ky
  • of the promised land they blew it. We have to give him time. Secretary Rusk: Let's go back on 24-hour, 4 November basis. The President: Ben Read). (Read note on conversation between Cy Vance and Tell Kosygin the best laid plans of mice and men often come
  • that in conversations with/General de Maiziere, certain plans that would be recommended by the military to the German government became more clear. The government had already decided on an increase in the military budget of 750 million DM ($165 million). They were
  • it was passed. I had an interesting conversation with Prime Minister Menzies over the weekend. He said he did not see how we could win the war without more public statements. He said there is a need to repeat statements over and over. He thinks we should repeat
  • . They are not in the business of talking about negotiations at this stage. It has been a one way conversation. Bo does want contacts to continue . I do not think this is just be cause of the ten mile radius around Hanoi. T here is little d anger now that talk s w ill bre a k
  • Government which had a governmental rather than a personal tone. sa~or, The President asked whether we had any other channels of communica­ tion. He recalled the Seaborn channel. He was reminded of the conversations which are apparently being carried
  • the nature of the Pueblo mission and the reason the ship could not be better protected. ### ScR I MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH CHARLES BARTLETT - FEBRUARY 13, Mr. Bartlett began the conversation by saying it was good to see the President taking
  • are definitively halted. 3. The Soviets, who we believe may have tried for peace on at least two occasions in the past, are now silent and not offering the slightest encourage ment to us or to anyone else. Their conversations confirm our reading that TOP 5ECRE1
  • to do is make a speech from the pamphlet. The group adjourned for lunch and the President opened the luncheon conversation by asking about Buttercup response. "Are both Bunker and Westmoreland coming back?" the President asked. McNamara replied
  • The Pope said that if this line were in the release it would appear that the Pope was endorsing war. The conversation resumed.} POPE I am grateful for your visit and also your sentiments and your work in behalf of peace. I will never forget our
  • been engaged a. By supporting the Jarring Mission we have been seeking to move toward a settlement of the Arab -Israeli dispute. More than 50 bilateral conversations have b e en held. The two countries have now given papers to Ambassador Jarring who
  • a paper expressing general opposition. Then Hickenlooper and Rusk had a dis cuss ion comparing this situation with the Cuban situation. Following some conversation with Secretary Rusk by Mrs. Bolton and Senator Saltonstall, Senator Aiken asked for Mr
  • to the Security Council but we wish to cont ro l the circumstances of that discussion. He recalled when we had proceeded in a similar manner following the Desoto Patrol incident in the Gulf of Tonkin . Ambassador Thompson summarized h i s conversation with Soviet
  • the commitment to South Vietna.in• In general, the peace offensive is supported, but doubts are expressed that it would produce any results. Ambassador Goldberg reported on his conversations with UN Secretary General U Thant, the Pope, Italian leaders, de Gaulle
  • have a lot to show. We could say we have informed them if they shell the cities and do rot respect the DMZ the deal is off. We have told the Soviets that. ­ The conversation with Gromyko had this as part and parcel of the agreement. understanding
  • if the President could sit down for two hours of a relaxed conversation especially concerning the bombing program over the next year and year and a half. It was decided to add Ambassador Eugene Locke to the schedule Wednesday, and George Christian asked if Locke
  • ___ I' ...... 6. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION ZAID EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ARE THINGS KING IS THI~KING. THIS IS HIS READING Or SITUATION • ACTUALLY HIS ADVISERS ARE TRYING WITHOUT MUCH HOPE Or SUCCESS TO CONVINCE HIM TO MAKE NO DRASTIC MOVES. YET, MANY
  • rather than a personal tone . The President asked whether we had any other channels o f communica ­ tion. He recalled the Seaborn channel. He was reminded of the conversations which are apparently being carried on informall y by the French i n P a r
  • MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd, about 9:15 a. m. The conversation lasted approxi• matel y 15 minutes . 1. The President entered Mr. Bundy' a office alone and no one was present during the conversation. 2
  • into a very harsh position. They were pessimistic about the outcome. Norway thinks Hanoi is not interested in conversation. They say that Hanoi believes it would have to offer concessions so large as to persuade them that a better course is to wait
  • of Co:pay right f-foldar: 'W. Thonaen Je~Men ~ -6pacification demanded by the Turks. While during the morning hours of December 3 the Turkish Government pondered and finally rejected this proposal, we engaged in extensive teletype conversations